NATIONAL STRATEGY
TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

September, 2016
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>Counter Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith Based Organisation</td>
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<td>GoK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<td>Dae‘sh</td>
<td>Islamic State or ISIS</td>
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<td>KDF</td>
<td>Kenya Defence Forces</td>
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<td>KPS</td>
<td>Kenya Prisons Service</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Ministries Departments and Agencies</td>
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<td>MDP</td>
<td>Ministry of Devolution and Planning</td>
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<td>MEST</td>
<td>Ministry of Education Science and Technology</td>
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<td>MICNG</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government</td>
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<td>MOICT</td>
<td>Ministry of Information Communication and Technology</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mombasa Republican Council</td>
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<td>MSCA</td>
<td>Ministry of Sports, Culture and Arts</td>
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<td>NCIC</td>
<td>National Cohesion and Integration Commission</td>
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<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counter-Terrorism Centre</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>National Police Service</td>
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<td>NSAC</td>
<td>National Security and Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSC-Peace</td>
<td>National Steering Committee on Peace Building &amp; Conflict Management</td>
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<td>NSCVE</td>
<td>National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>NYS</td>
<td>National Youth Service</td>
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<td>PC</td>
<td>Peace Committees</td>
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<td>POCA</td>
<td>Prevention of Organised Crime Act</td>
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<td>Prevention of Organised Crime and Money Laundering Act</td>
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<td>Prevention of Terrorism Act</td>
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<td>SL(A)A</td>
<td>Security Laws Amendment Act 2014</td>
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<td>SLO</td>
<td>State Law Office</td>
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<td>TSC</td>
<td>Teachers Service Commission</td>
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
Counter Radicalisation – refers to efforts to delegitimise violent extremist ideologies, and to deter recruitment into specific terrorist groups or campaigns. It involves targeted efforts to reduce the access to citizens by influential individuals and groups whose deliberate mission is to expand support for terrorism.

Countering Violent Extremism – is the employment of non-coercive means to delegitimise violent extremist ideologies and thus reduce the number of terrorist group supporters and recruits.

De-radicalisation – refers to concerted efforts directed at radicalised individuals to cause them to change their views to reject violent extremist ideologies and to seek to act within Kenya’s legal and constitutional bounds. It is often aimed at prisoners convicted of terrorist or violent extremist crimes, or voluntary returnees from active participation in terrorist groups.

Disengagement – refers to individuals deserting, defecting or demobilising from terrorist groups and activities. This is a behavioural or declarative act and does not necessarily include the psychological and social dimensions of de-radicalisation.

Radicalisation – is a gradual or phased process that employs the ideological conditioning of individuals and groups to socialise them into violent extremism, and recruitment into terrorist groups or campaigns. It is dependent on a fanatical ideology that rejects dialogue and compromise in favour of a ends-justifies-ends approach, particularly in the willingness to utilise mass violence to advance political aims – defined in racial, ethnic, sectarian and religious terms – opposed to the democratic principles enshrined in Kenya’s Constitution.

Rehabilitation – is a process that aims to ensure that disengaged and de-radicalised violent extremists and terrorists, particularly returnees from Al Shabaab and like groups, are given the counselling, critical reasoning tools, and knowledge to shift their mind-sets and enable them to be peaceful and law-abiding citizens.

Reintegration – refers to actions that support the social, ideological, psychological, and economic wellbeing of rehabilitated individuals as they return to live with their families and communities, and that ensure that they remain peaceful and law-abiding in the long run.

Self-radicalisation – refers to the process whereby an individual becomes a violent extremist without any specific terrorist group engaging him directly; it often occurs through access to extremist propaganda via media and the Internet.

Terrorism – according to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 (POTA), a "terrorist act" means an act or threat of action — (a) which — (i) involves the use of violence against a person; (ii) endangers the life of a person, other than the person committing the action; (iii) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; (iv) results in serious damage to property; (v) involves the use of firearms or explosives; (vi) involves the release of any dangerous, hazardous, toxic or radioactive substance or microbial or other biological agent or toxin into the environment; (vii) interferes with an electronic system resulting in the disruption of the provision of communication, financial, transport or other essential services; (viii) interferes
or disrupts the provision of essential or emergency services; (ix) prejudices national security or public safety; and (b) which is carried out with the aim of — (i) intimidating or causing fear amongst members of the public or a section of the public; or (ii) intimidating or compelling the Government or international organisation to do, or refrain from any act; or (iii) destabilising the religious, political, Constitutional, economic or social institutions of a country, or an international organisation.

**Terrorist Groups or Organisations** – are typically structured as revolutionary vanguard organisations whose employ of violence is intended to broaden their ideological appeal to a larger religious/racial/ethnic/social grouping. They utilise violence without legal or moral restraints and use front groups and a disguised command-and-control hierarchy for propaganda, ideological indoctrination, and mass mobilisation.

**Violent Extremism** – refers to actions of radicalised individuals who are prepared to engage in, or actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies.
FOREWORD BY
H.E. PRESIDENT
UHURU KENYATTA, C.G.H.
In large parts of the globe, including Africa, terrorists and violent extremists are on the march. Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, ISIS, and their affiliates are determined to undo the global order of sovereign states, open trade, and respect for one another’s cultures and nationalities. They reject our Way of Life. Kenya’s social and political fabric is anchored in the nationalist covenant born from the struggle for independence and that is underwritten by our democracy, respect for the dignity of all people, regardless of race, religion, gender or nationality, and freedom of worship, association and speech. Indeed, they regard democracy as evil and our way of life as worth destroying.

The world’s security agencies, and the overwhelming bulk of civil society stand against them. On every continent, armies and police forces are fighting them. Yet as important as the conventional means of security are in protecting citizens and states, they are insufficient to fight a war that must be waged not only against the wanton destruction of innocent lives and property, but also against the insidious spread of an evil ideology. The terrorist attacks are more than acts of violence; they are propaganda for a fanatical religious-political movement that seeks to divide and terrorise communities and to collapse states in pursuit of political and economic power.

In response to the domestic challenge, the Kenyan government has launched an unprecedented multi-agency security operation. This has resulted in a sharp increase in operational tempo to detect, deter and disrupt the activities of terrorists. To ensure lasting success, these means must be complemented by a resistance to the terrorists’ ideology, which cloaks an unrestrained will to power cloaked in false invocations of Islamic texts and history. Their professed desire to establish a global caliphate is profoundly undemocratic and opposed to the prosperous and secure country that Kenyans are building.

This strategy responds to the need to drain our society of radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremism by engaging the public and all instruments of national power. It will be driven forward by a strengthened National Counter Terrorism Centre whose inter-agency nature is key to effectively coordinating different arms of government and multiple stakeholders in the civil space.

I am confident that this strategy is a critical step in protecting and advancing the liberty and prosperity of our people. Its lessons will be visible to all, and I look forward to their being shared with the region and the world as we look to build a just and peaceful international order.

HIS EXCELLENCY HON. UHURU KENYATTA, C.G.H.
PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCES
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA
It is an important development for Kenya to comprehensively complement our counter terrorism efforts with this National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE). It will add the critical dimensions of preventing, countering and reversing radicalisation, and engaging the public so that every Kenyan, and every community, resists violent extremism. Reflecting its public focus, this strategy has been developed through an inclusive, consultative process involving government agencies and county governments, religious leaders, civil society, the private sector, the research community, and regional and international partners.

This strategy will coordinate the government and the broad spectrum of stakeholders in the design and implementation of CVE initiatives.

The NSCVE is a living document subject to periodic review. Its desired End State is “to rally all sectors of Kenyan social, religious, and economic life to emphatically and continuously reject violent extremist ideologies and aims in order to shrink the pool of individuals that terrorist groups seek to radicalise and recruit” To attain that end, it rallies a broad section of Kenyan stakeholders to seek specific Operational Outcomes. The work is Prioritised, takes place at the Local and National Level, and is organised in Pillars to ensure there is structure and the opportunity for inclusion of effective actors across a spectrum of skills and opportunities.

The work, in its operational and strategic dimensions, will be continuously Measured as a means to judge Kenya’s progress in fulfilling progress to the Strategic End State.

The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is the coordinating mechanism for the NSCVE and the focal point for foreign partnerships. The NCTC will work closely with the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, alongside the security agencies, and other GoK institutions, to ensure that they are coordinated and work hand-in-glove with communities, civil society, the private sector and bilateral and multilateral partners.

I will be on hand to lend every support to its successful implementation to achieve a secure and united Kenya.

HON. MAJOR GENERAL (RTD.) JOSEPH NKAISERR, E.G.H., C.B.S.
CABINET SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE VIOLENT EXTREMIST THREAT TO KENYA

Events in our time have thrust Kenya to the frontline of a regional and global struggle against terrorist groups and violent extremists.

Since the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi by Al Qaeda, there have been almost 900 fatalities and over 6,000 seriously injured in Kenya by terrorist attacks.

There are multiple forms of violent extremism but the main threat to the Kenya is based on Salafi-Jihadi ideology that is embraced by Al Shabaab group (Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidin), Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Horn of Africa, and other terrorist organisations such as Daesh (ISIS) that seek ‘entry’ into the Horn of Africa. This violent salafism is the key driver of turning multiple political, social, economic and personal schisms into drivers of radicalisation, recruitment, motivation to engage in violence and justify it.

In furtherance of their objectives, terrorist groups like Al Shabaab seek every opportunity to create a network of local collaborators through radicalisation and recruitment in Kenya. To do this, they employ criminal networks, the charity sector, and religious, educational and social centres.

THE STRATEGIC END STATE

Accordingly, the ultimate goal of the Government of Kenya in developing this inclusive National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism is rally all sectors of Kenyan social, religious, and economic life to emphatically and continuously reject violent extremist ideologies and aims in order to shrink the pool of individuals whom terrorist groups can radicalise and recruit.

This is a strategy that been developed through extensive collaboration, and that is owned by the full spectrum of Kenyan social, economic and political life. It depends on collaboration between and among citizens, communities, local and national leadership, state bodies at the national, county and local level, NGOs, CBOs, religious authorities, researchers, and the private sector.

THE OPERATIONAL OUTCOMES

To successfully travel from the present reality to the End State above, the operational work of CVE stakeholders, communities and the country must be focused on attaining the following Outcomes:

1. For Kenyans to individually and collectively embrace patriotism and service to the Nation; a deep appreciation of the Kenyan Way of Life as represented in the Constitution; the ability to delegitimise and reject violent extremist ideologies; the ability to deploy accessible early warning and early intervention tools against radicalisation that has the confidence of the public; the ability to enable violent extremists to disengage from membership of terrorist groups, and to embrace deradicalisation and reintegration.
2. It will also call for coordinated, innovative and impact-focused CVE work by all stakeholders; sustained support for CVE by national and local leaders; availability of financial and human resources for CVE initiatives that are demand-responsive; and for CVE to be evidence-driven, non-dogmatic, and built on knowledge that is locally relevant.

THE PRIORITIES

The National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism will achieve these Outcomes by taking the following broad-based priorities such as counteracting violent extremist ideologies; promote patriotism for Kenya’s nationhood; enhance GOK support to local communities that are targeted by violent extremists; develop radicalisation early warning and early intervention measures; rehabilitation and reintegration support for individuals who disengage from violent extremism; develop expertise in non-coercive approaches to CVE in the Government of Kenya; effective utilisation of law enforcement to deter and prosecute radicalisers; research on the evolution of violent extremist ideologies, organisational models, and radicalisation methodologies; and stakeholder action that offers clear pathways and guidelines for stakeholder engagement in CVE. These lines of action when pursued in collaborative and coordinated fashion will immensely advance the security of Kenyan citizens, communities and protect our democratic way of life.

THE WAY THE WORK IS ORGANISED

CVE work is structured to take place within pillars, at the national and local level, and along the spectrum of national efforts to more targeted, individual ones.

(A) WORK PILLARS

The following 9 work pillars offer opportunities for multiple stakeholders to engage in CVE.

1. Psychosocial Pillar: It is important to address the psychosocial needs of individuals who have been radicalised and even joined violent extremist groups. The focus here is on rehabilitation, re-integration of reformed extremists, and providing support to their families and social networks.

2. Education Pillar: The aim is to address radicalisation in learning institutions.

3. Political Pillar: Engaging political leaders at the local, county, and national levels.

4. Security Pillar: To ensure that radicalisation is met with the full force of law.

5. Faith Based and Ideological Pillar: The aim of this pillar is to ‘immunise’ the Kenyan population to violent extremist ideologies.

6. Training and Capacity Building Pillar: Will ensure that GoK institutions, political and religious leaders, and all actors with a mandate to undertake CVE possess the right skills and awareness.
7. **Arts and Culture Pillar**: Radicalisation at its core is an attack on the cultures and heritage of the Kenyan people. Under this pillar, the focus is on protecting and promoting Kenya’s heritage.

8. **Legal and Policy Pillar**: Relevant laws and policy frameworks must support CVE.

9. **Media and Online Pillar**: The aim of the pillar is to have CVE practitioners move their campaigns to cyber space and to have the tools and mind-set to keep with the pace of innovation by terrorist groups.

(B) **DISENGAGEMENT & REINTEGRATION**

It is crucial that the GoK build capabilities at local and national level to receive de-radicalised and dis-engaged individuals, rehabilitate them and reintegrate them into law-abiding and peaceful society.

(C) **NATIONAL AND LOCAL ACTION**

These approaches must carefully distinguish between the national and local level, particularly to ensure that the latter is not overlooked so as to achieve sound planning and effective implementation. Working with the County Security and Intelligence Committees plus local civil society is a top priority.

(D) **THE RESEARCH AGENDA FOR CVE**

CVE needs to be driven by evidence adapt to change as necessary. This requires that it be anchored in robust conceptual approaches and empirical research rooted in the particularities of regions, countries, and local neighbourhoods and communities.

(E) **STAKEHOLDER ENTRY POINTS FOR EFFECTIVE CVE**

Stakeholders — spanning government bodies, national and local leaders, bilateral and multilateral partners, religious and community leaders, civil society, the private sector, and the research community — have been provided a framework for engagement in CVE.

(F) **MEASURING CVE IMPACT**

The National Counter Terrorism Centre will carry out an annual assessment of the impact of major donor programmes and funding on violent extremism at the local and national level. It will also measure the impact of GoK initiatives. This assessment will be availed to the national leadership.

(G) **COORDINATION, STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT, AND MEASUREMENT**

The NCTC will be the lead agency to coordinate actors (state, non-state and bilateral and multilateral partners) involved in the implementation process. This strategy provides clear guidelines for stakeholder engagement, accountability and measurement.
SECTION 1: THE CONTEXT, RATIONALE AND AIMS OF THE STRATEGY
(A) THREAT ANALYSIS

Kenya has been beset by terrorism since 1998, and it is now the biggest security threat facing the nation. Initially, foreign interests in Kenya and not its citizens were the primary targets, although Kenyan citizens were the majority of its victims. In 1998, Al Qaeda struck Kenya in the twin 1998 US embassies bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam. In 2002, Al Qaeda again attacked at the Kenyan coast, targeting an Israeli hotel and airline. By 2006, a governance and security vacuum in neighbouring Somalia had created a space for the emergence of the Somalia-based Al Shabaab (Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidin), Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Horn of Africa. Al Shabaab led a series of attacks across Kenya’s northeast border, abducting and killing foreign aid workers and tourists and dealing a blow to Kenya’s tourism industry. In 2011, Kenyan troops entered Somalia to prevent these cross-border attacks, and later joined AMISOM to help close the space instability there creates for terrorists.

Kenya has become a target in Al Shabaab’s oft-stated agenda to establish an Eastern African region of a global caliphate. The terrorists seek to ensure a constant supply of recruits through radicalisation and recruitment of vulnerable Kenyan youths through networks that include online recruitment.

The Salafi-Jihadi ideology propagated by terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab, has gained momentum with the emergence of Daesh. The five-year civil war in Syria, the instability in Iraq and the spill over of the chaos and anarchy following the 2011 overthrow of Mu’ammar Gaddafi in Libya have spawned new and complex configurations in international terrorist networks. The limited reach of state institutions in parts of the Sahel, West Africa and the Horn has attracted terrorist groups, and spread instability and disorder in large swathes of mostly ungoverned space.

As a result, the terrorism and violent extremism threat will continue to be dynamic and extremely dangerous, not only in Kenya but also globally, as it evolves and adapts to countermeasures.

(B) A DEMOCRACY THREATENED BY TERRORISM

The Kenyan Republic was crafted in the struggle against colonialism between the communities that make Kenya. The National Anthem, written in 1963, speaks of a ‘Common Bond’. This represents a national covenant forged in the years preceding independence and that with every passing year has strengthened. A Common Bond made to seek freedom, and with that freedom to find the tools to fight poverty, ignorance, and disease, while forging a prosperous and secure nation.
This unwritten contract is what has forged Kenya. Its temporal, and most recent, articulation is the Kenyan Constitution that was promulgated in August 2010 and consolidated the democratic aspirations of the people.

The Constitution has devolved power, provided robust checks and balances, and ensured rights and liberties in a strong Bill of Rights. This deepening democratisation has transformed Kenyan politics and national life, expanding popular participation, improving governance and strengthening accountability. Kenya — a democratic country with harmonious multi-religious relations that is host to multiple global institutions and extensive diplomatic and international commercial interests — is the very antithesis of the closed, isolated, authoritarian, and intolerant society violent extremists want to impose on the region. Yet its openness presents a unique challenge for combatting terrorism. This is because its cherished democratic attributes— freedoms of speech, press and association, privacy and judicial independence, and support of active civil society—can also be exploited to enable radicalisation and recruitment into terrorist groups.

In this context, a purely security-driven response to the terrorist threat that does not respond in a careful and measured way to this duality risks undermining democratic freedom and indirectly advancing the terrorist’s anti-democratic agenda. Instead, what is needed is an inclusive approach that fosters patriotism, the desire to defend democracy, resistance to salafi-jihadism and other violent extremist ideologies, and trust between security agencies and citizens.

(C) OBJECTIVES OF THE NSCVE

Strategic End State

The NSCVE identifies violent extremism as primarily social and political, not merely security, phenomena. The Strategic End State of this strategy is to rally all sectors of Kenyan social, religious, and economic life to emphatically and continuously reject violent extremist ideologies and aims to shrink the pool of individuals whom terrorist groups can radicalise and recruit.

To achieve the objectives above, the operational focus of CVE networks and stakeholders, communities and the country must seek to attain the following Outcomes:

1. For the Kenyan people to demonstrate patriotism as a minimum obligation to our Nationhood and its foundations in the pursuit of freedom for all Kenyans.

2. A deep appreciation throughout Kenya of the Kenyan Way of Life as represented in the rights and responsibilities in the Constitution.

3. The ability to delegitimise and reject violent extremist ideologies.

4. The ability to deploy accessible early warning and early intervention tools against radicalisation that has the confidence of the public.
5. The ability to enable violent extremists to disengage from membership of terrorist groups, and to embrace de-radicalisation and reintegration.

6. Coordinated, innovative and impact-focused CVE work by all stakeholders.

7. Sustained support for CVE by national and local leaders.

8. Availability of financial and human resources for CVE initiatives that are demand-responsive.

9. For CVE to be evidence-driven, non-dogmatic, and built on knowledge that is locally relevant.

**The Priorities**

The NSCVE will only be able to attain the outcomes above by prioritising its work. The top priorities have been identified as:

1. **Counter Violent Extremism Messaging:** Inspire, rally and facilitate a local, communal, national and global rejection of extremist ideologies antithetical to the Kenya’s Nationhood and Way of Life as articulated in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and popularise narratives that minimise sympathy for terrorism as a means to change society or politics.

2. **Promote Patriotism for Kenya’s nationhood:** Patriotism is a force multiplier against violent extremism. It should be promoted as the citizen’s obligation to defend Kenya, its religions and cultures from violent extremists.

3. **Enhance GOK support to local communities that are targeted by violent extremists:** Develop a comprehensive approach to support local communities fighting violent extremism and to address communal grievances upon which violent extremist recruiters mobilise support.

4. **Develop radicalisation early warning and early intervention measures:** Radicalisation is a phased process that allows opportunities for intervention to mitigate it or redirect the individual to a safer, more empowering path. It is important for the parents, teachers, friends and colleagues of those being radicalised to be able to recognise the signs and know where to turn to for help.

5. **Rehabilitation and Reintegration Support for individuals who disengage from violent extremism:** Develop and implement a coordinated GoK and community-based approach to ensuring effective demobilisation and reintegration of violent extremists who have disengaged or responded to amnesty offers, including psychosocial support, education and training.

6. **Develop expertise in non-coercive approaches to CVE in the Government of Kenya and particularly in the security services:** Ensure that effective and up-to-date CVE capabilities are provided to relevant government agencies and personnel.
7. **Effective utilisation of law enforcement to deter and prosecute radicalising individuals and institutions:** In a targeted fashion, reduce the time, space and opportunity for organised efforts at radicalising Kenyan citizens by enforcing the legal boundaries against radicalisation, incitement, and intimidation.

8. **Research:** Ensure that Kenya’s CVE actors have the benefit of a dynamic, action-ready and research-informed understanding of the evolution of violent extremist ideologies, organisational models, and radicalisation methodologies.

9. **Stakeholder Action:** Offer clear pathways and guidelines for citizens, communities, civil society, the private sector, media, and multilateral and bilateral partners to effectively and productively engage in CVE.

**Our Assumptions:** Our Theory of Change – or our assumption of what it will take to attain the Strategic End State – is that evidence-based counter- and de-radicalisation efforts that are collaborative, accountable, sensitive to the risks and mandates of national and human security, and focused on engaging and empowering the public will sharply reduce and eventually end radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremist groups.
SECTION 2: RADICALISATION
Radicalisation in Kenya is defined as a gradual or phased process that exploits the psychological, politico-religious, and ideological conditioning of individuals to believe that they are part of a threatened or combative collective identity, in order to socialise them to violent extremism. Preventing and mitigating radicalisation lies at the heart of effective CVE. In this section, the focus is on the drivers of radicalisation in Kenya and the locations and milieu in which it is conducted.

(A) DRIVERS OF RADICALISATION

The term ‘drivers’, as used herein, refers to experiences, perceptions and narratives that provide entry points for violent extremism.

Ideological Drivers

There are multiple forms of violent extremist ideology. Some are secular while others claim religious legitimacy. At present, the ideology that is most responsible for radicalisation in Kenya is disseminated by terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda, Dae’sh and Al Shabaab. Their Salafi-Jihadi ideology (or violent salafism) utilises a selective reading of some Islamic religious texts and histories to justify terrorist violence in the name of protecting and advancing Islam. They also use claims of global and local victimisation of Muslims to create militant recruits willing to carry out suicide and mass casualty attacks against civilians and infrastructure. These groups often express an ambition to establish an Eastern African region of a global caliphate that would replace secular legal and governance systems it depicts as illegitimate under Islam.

This ambition, as is evident from the actions of groups such as ISIS – is both a threat to world peace and a potent motivator of thousands of young people across the world that have been convinced to join the project.

Experts in Islamic religion worldwide have strongly rejected the terrorist organisations’ claims to religious legitimacy. In reality, their ideologies have no support in religion. They are driven by a will to power over populations and nation states. They are radically anti-democratic and, in their authoritarianism, willingness to use mass violence, and refusal to embrace diverse beliefs, are comparable to Stalinism or Nazism.

Socio-economic Drivers

Adverse socioeconomic conditions create high levels of frustration and a sense of powerlessness – ideal conditions for persuading groups and individuals to embrace violent extremism and to oppose the political, social and legal status quo.

Political Drivers

Real or perceived exclusion from political representation, discrimination, mis-governance and narratives of historical injustice are powerful drivers of radicalisation. Violent extremists often invoke such injustices to inspire opposition to national political structures.
**Personal Drivers**

These include the search for status, meaning, power, a sense of belonging and identity, or an all-encompassing theory to explain personal crises. Individuals personally susceptible to radicalisation include those experiencing low self-esteem, a sense of victimisation or alienation from normal social networks, boredom and frustration, and a sense of powerlessness.

**Global/Geopolitical Drivers**

Global and geopolitical drivers in Kenya are the local effects of international struggles between violent extremists and their opponents’ worldwide. Anger over Western country policies and interventions in the Middle-East and other acts associated with a perceived ‘Western’ agenda, including Kenya and AMISOM’s intervention against Al Shabaab in Somalia, drive reactions in Kenya by sympathisers with violent extremists. In addition, proponents of extremist ideologies abroad finance and facilitate the exportation of ideological extremism in the guise of religion.

**Technological Drivers**

Technological drivers include the wide availability of social media – blogs and chat-rooms – for disseminating extremist propaganda. The increasing affordability of smartphones and data means that there is now borderless connectivity that allows extremist ideologies to be produced far from Kenya but consumed by millions of Kenyans. This allows for self-radicalisation, and clandestine recruitment and training online. Technologies of encryption of digital communications further facilitate dissemination and evasion by radicalisers.

**(B) WHERE RADICALISATION IS HAPPENING**

The primary radicalisation hotspots in early 2016 include: Nairobi, the Coast region, especially Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi, and the North East, especially Isiolo County, Moyale Sub-County and Marsabit town. However, due to ease of communication, radicalisation can easily spread throughout the country. Properly targeting CVE requires state actors to have a precise and continually updated knowledge of locations and modes of radicalisation.

**Educational Institutions**

Extremist elements and actual terrorist operatives have managed to infiltrate some educational institutions including primary and secondary schools, and colleges and universities. There they spread terrorist ideologies, often taking advantage of environments in which free speech and inquiry are encouraged to disguise their mission. The social and economic conditions that enable radicalization – such as un/under employment – often have strongest impact on a rapidly growing youth population with high expectations of social and economic mobility.
Religious Institutions

Extremist clerics seek to take control of Mosques, Madrassas and Islamic Welfare Institutions in Kenya, sometimes inciting radicalised youth to violently claim these institutions. Their control of these institutions offers them opportunities to radicalise Kenyans.

Internet and Mass media

Kenya has one of the highest internet connectivity rates in Africa. Kenyans, particularly the youth, increasingly gain their news and worldview from social media, blogs, and chat rooms. Other popular means of communication include electronic media (such as videos, CDs), mass media, and, especially, smartphone communications applications. These provide anonymous spaces for spreading violent extremist ideas and false propaganda. They also facilitate recruiting, training, and even the planning and coordination of attacks.

Remand Centres and Prisons

Remand facilities and prisons play a critical role in the radicalisation process. They provide jailed terrorists and their supporters with a captive audience of disaffected individuals, free of distractions. Recruiters exploit the vulnerability of their fellow prisoners by offering prayers, psychosocial support, and financial assistance during incarceration and after release.

Refugee Camps

The presence of a large refugee population in Dadaab and Kakuma camps has provided extremist elements a platform to carry out radicalisation and recruitment and to support terrorist activities. Violent extremists take advantage of the refugees’ protected and isolated status to carry out recruitment and provide logistical support to their colleagues.

Neighbourhood Dynamics

Some communities and neighbourhoods provide fertile grounds for radicalisation. Though this is occurring at every end of the economic spectrum, it is in poorer urban neighbourhoods that the bulk of radicalisation is taking place. There, rapid demographic change due to urbanisation has often outstripped the ability of the economy to absorb and support populations. The resulting frustration is exacerbated by the marked lack of social amenities that would positively occupy the youth in particular. Often, there is often a growing generational gulf between parents and their children in terms of worldview, and an increased resistance by youth to traditional authority figures.

Training Camps Locally and Abroad

Active and sleeper training camps within Kenya and abroad provide operational and tactical training capability for the recruits, offering practical experience within the radical group ranks.
**PHASES OF RADICALISATION**

Countering violent extremism involves the use of crime prevention methods that use soft and hard approaches to address the following four phases of radicalisation.

**Pre-Radicalisation** is the earliest exposure of an individual to the radical ideology, appealing narratives and other inducements by recruiters.

**Self-Identification** is the phase where individuals begin to explore radical ideology and membership of extremist groups. They gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with radicalised individuals and adopt the extremist ideology.

**Indoctrination** is the phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts extremists’ ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause.

**Violent Extremism** refers to radicalised individuals who are prepared to engage in, or actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies.
SECTION 3:
STRUCTURING CVE WORK
This section proposes the approaches, focus and work pillars to guide national CVE. Stakeholders with different capabilities and priorities will be able to find opportunities here to contribute to CVE.

(A) APPROACHES TO PREVENTION

There are three levels of prevention.

Level One - General Preventive Efforts

This level targets the whole of Kenyan society to address conditions that support the spread and adoption of violent extremist ideology. Interventions at this level concentrate on building community resilience by strengthening social cohesion, citizenship buy-in, patriotism, and African values of unity and social harmony.

Level Two - Specific Preventive Efforts

This level targets environments that enable the early stages of radicalisation. In the specific context of the present threat in Kenya, it is crucial to inform, educate and empower Sheikhs, Alims, Imams, and local communities to be able to resist the threat posed by extremists. Specific preventive efforts will also target prisons and remand facilities.

Level Three - Individually Oriented Preventive Efforts

At this level, efforts will target individuals who are becoming radicalised or are part of a violent extremist group, and can be motivated to disengage. These are typically those who are not the direct subject of counter-terrorism operations or in the criminal justice process for terrorist-related offences. Efforts at this level offer the individuals a way out before it is too late.

(B) WORK PILLARS FOR CVE

CVE work, and particularly counter-radicalisation at the general, specific and individual level, will be organised into the pillars below.

Psychosocial Pillar

It is important to address the psychosocial needs of individuals who have been radicalised and even gone as far as joining violent extremist networks or groups. The same is true of their families who often also experience trauma, fear and shame.

The focus here is on:

1. Rehabilitation, re-integration of reformed extremists, and providing support to affected families and social networks.
2. Providing access to on-going support for rehabilitated and reintegrated former extremists.

3. Early warning and early intervention efforts to prevent radicalisation leading to violent extremism.

4. Families, to prevent radicalisation of family members and to assist disengagement of those involved in violent extremism.

**Education Pillar**

The aim is to address radicalisation in learning institutions from elementary, tertiary to higher education levels. There is a particular emphasis on programming within educational institutions that enhances the appreciation of cooperation, free thought and positive acceptance of ethnic, racial, and religious diversity.

**Political Pillar**

In a democratic country, engaging political leaders at the local, county, and national levels is key to countering radicalisation. Agencies will work with political leaders to assist them to advocate for increased cohesion, patriotism, and rejection of all extremist ideologies based on religious or ethnic dogma.

**Security Pillar**

The aim here is to ensure that radicalisation is met with the full force of law whenever and wherever possible. It is also important that CT and CVE efforts be conducted in accordance with laws and best practices to ensure that they do not lead to alienation and radicalisation of citizens.

**Faith Based and Ideological Pillar**

The aim of this pillar is to ‘immunise’ the Kenyan population to violent extremist ideologies, particularly by promoting values of freedom, democracy and interfaith tolerance. A major priority will be to engage Faith Based Organisations to counter violent extremism ideology by pointing to its errors and inaccuracies and to deny anti-democratic and anti-cohesion forces a platform.

**Training and Capacity Building Pillar**

This pillar will ensure that government institutions, political and religious leaders, and all actors with a mandate to counter radicalisation possess the right skills, tools and awareness.

**Arts and Culture Pillar**

Radicalisation at its core is an attack on the cultures and heritage of the Kenyan people. It is driven by an ideology that aggressively attacks the cultural traditions and histories of African and other peoples as illegitimate and as deserving violent “cleansing” or rejection. The art as the domain of creation and freedom of expression is a powerful counter to the authoritarian, fanatical ideology of violent extremists and key to communal and national resilience. Under this
pillar, the action priorities include supporting cultural and arts activities that showcase Kenya and Africa’s diversity of views, histories and cultural production, and co-existence.

**Legal and Policy Pillar**

Relevant laws and policy frameworks must support CVE. There should be an annual review of the efficacy of laws and policies for CVE carried out through the coordination by the NCTC, and that includes relevant GoK actors such as the Attorney-General, DPP, the Ministry of Interior, NPS, and NIS. Political leaders at the local and national levels, communities, civil society, and researchers should also be consulted.

**Media and Online Pillar**

The networks advancing violent extremism increasingly seek to attain their aims online. Efforts under this pillar include deploying counter narratives on-line, sensitising media not to be unwitting transmitters of images or narratives that further the cause of terrorists, engaging the private sector in communications technologies and while encouraging citizens to identify and resist extremist speech on-line.

**(C) Disengagement & Reintegration**

It is crucial that the GoK build capabilities at local and national level to receive de-radicalised and dis-engaged individuals, rehabilitate them and reintegrate them into law-abiding and peaceful society. This is particularly so because there was a rapid mass disengagement from Al Shabaab following the 2014 government amnesty with hundreds of Kenyans leaving the ranks of Al Shabaab to return to Kenya or to their civilian lives. There is a high degree of probability that this momentum will be sustained, and will include members of other violent extremist and terrorist organisations.

The broad approaches that will be taken to engage the different categories of radicalised individuals and groups, including:

1. Those that are radicalised and on the brink of joining violent extremist organisations;

2. Members of violent extremist organisations who have not committed or facilitated violent attacks in Kenya or abroad, or for whom there is no evidence of such crimes;

3. Individuals who have voluntarily left violent extremist and terrorist organisations with the wish to no longer support violence or radicalisation, and those who have left such groups in response to an amnesty offer;

4. Individuals convicted of terrorist-related crimes and who pose a risk of radicalising fellow inmates or who voluntarily seek to assist de-radicalisation efforts while serving their sentences.

5. Individuals ordered by courts to participate in de-radicalisation and reintegration efforts.
Below are the approaches – de-radicalisation, disengagement, rehabilitation, re-integration – that will be utilised to encourage, facilitate and educate the categories of individuals above to forswear violence and violent extremist ideologies.

**FOCUS OF DISENGAGEMENT & REINTEGRATION**

**De-radicalisation**

Refers to programmes directed at radicalised individuals to cause them to reject violent extremist ideologies and to actively seek to act within Kenya’s legal and constitutional bounds.

**Disengagement**

Refers to individuals deserting, defecting or demobilising from terrorist groups and activities. This is a behavioural or declarative act and not necessarily de-radicalisation in its psychological and social dimensions. It can be carried out at various levels:

- Targeting organisational change by disrupting violent extremist networks and the groups.
- Disengagement of individuals who are willing to exit from violent extremism.

**Rehabilitation**

Rehabilitation is a process that aims to ensure that demobilised and de-radicalised violent extremists and terrorists, particularly returnees from Al Shabaab and like groups, are given counselling, critical reasoning skills, and knowledge to enable them to be peaceful and law-abiding citizens. It is achieved through:

- Psychosocial and mental health support for the affected individuals.
- Reconciliation efforts through dialogue with the affected individuals, their families, their social networks, and communities.
- Identifying skills and talents with the view to leveraging them to empower those affected or giving alternatives to support them.

**Re-integration**

Re-integration refers to actions that support the social, ideological, psychological, and economic wellbeing of rehabilitated individuals as they return to live with their families and communities.

It is a process that involves documentation, safety, investigation and settlement support programmes. Its success requires social willingness to accept and accommodate the affected, and thus requires concerted efforts to lower stigma and encourage acceptance. Regular after-care and monitoring programmes are carried out to observe and evaluate progress.
(D) NATIONAL AND LOCAL ACTION

These approaches must carefully distinguish between the national and local level, particularly to ensure that the latter is not overlooked so as to achieve sound planning and effective implementation.

National Level Action

At the national level, the NCTC will be the focal point for the management of radicalised returnees to the country. The results of its coordinating efforts shall be reported regularly to the National Security Advisory Committee. The following are initiatives and capabilities that need to be developed at the national level:

- The development of a legislative and policy framework covering returnees.
- The design, launch and deployment of a National Disengagement and Reintegration initiative and monitoring to ensure that this initiative is not penetrated and utilised negatively by violent extremists.
- The coordination of training and capacity building at the local level by partner GoK agencies, allied foreign security agencies, county governments, bilateral and multilateral actors, research organisations, and national and global civil society.
- Psychological support and counselling programmes; social and livelihood/employment support; support for reintegrating individuals’ families and social network; mentoring and religious/ideological counselling.
- Effective information sharing between government agencies concerning the status of returnees, disengaged individuals and those radicalised individuals.
- A training clearing-house at the NCTC that delivers skills modules to security and GoK agencies engaged in CT and CVE at the national and local levels. The clearing-house should seek to deconflict and align donor capacity building initiatives to specific identified needs.

Local Level Action

At the local level, County Security and Intelligence Committees will consult with the NCTC and coordinate action with local and religious leaders, NGOs, economic development organisations, the private sector, researchers and engaged citizens to launch de-radicalisation and disengagement efforts that are connected with national level initiatives. At the local level, it is crucial that the following capabilities and approaches be deployed:

- Regular two-way communication with national authorities on de-radicalisation, disengagement and integration efforts.
• Confidence building initiatives between communities and state security and governance agencies.

• Linkages between efforts such as Nyumba Kumi, Peace Committees, and Community Policing and disengagement, de-radicalisation and reintegration efforts.

• Creation of early intervention teams under the direction of the County Commissioner or other relevant CSIC officer and made up of individuals drawn from the GoK agencies, local NGOs/CBOs, religious and local leaders, and other relevant people who can effectively intervene to halt the drive through radicalisation.

(E) THE RESEARCH AGENDA FOR CVE

CVE needs to be evidence driven. This requires that it be anchored in robust conceptual approaches and empirical research rooted in the particularities of regions, countries, and local neighbourhoods. As studies indicate, the movement from radicalisation to recruitment and then attack has stark variations depending on the context, so it would be an error to assume that there is a single approach to understanding and subsequently mitigating terrorism and violent extremism.

At the launch of the NSCVE, the priorities for the research agenda, which will obviously change with circumstances, are:

1. Religious doctrines that are misused by violent extremists to further their radicalisation, recruitment and motivation, and authoritative interpretations of those doctrines.

2. The social, economic and cultural roots of extremism and its link to radicalisation into terrorism.

3. Effective methods of counter-messaging, particularly on the Internet.

4. African cultural and social traditions promoting pluralism and counter extremism.

5. The dynamics of youth identity, extremism and radicalisation.

6. The role of families and communities in countering violent extremism.

7. Nexus between radicalisation and personal psychosocial, economic and existential crises.

8. The nexus between terrorism and transnational organised crime.

9. The sources of insurgent group cohesion, fragmentation and collapse.

10. Case studies in effective disengagement, de-radicalisation and reintegration of violent extremists.
The NSCVE is particularly motivated to encourage and facilitate research efforts that are Kenyan owned and driven.

The following are principles that should inform the research agenda:

• All field-based research must ensure adherence to research ethics including, the ‘do no harm’ principle, and the security of researchers, informants and communities.
• Seek to involve the local publics in the research as much as is possible and relevant.
• Research and data should be broadly accessible by the public.
• Multi-disciplinary approaches for research and analysis.
• Adherence to all applicable visa and permitting regulations, in particular in light of the security relevant dimensions of the subject.
• Funding for research should be transparent and competitive to ensure that it is merit based.
• All funding initiatives should centrally involve Kenyan researchers and scholars to strengthen the country’s long-term capabilities in CVE.
• Continuous feedback by policymakers to the research community of the kinds of research needed to strengthen CVE and CT efforts.

The following implementation approaches are particularly encouraged:

1. Identifying and sharing lessons learnt and ‘good practices’ from a global sampling that privileges efforts in democracies. Based on the shared understandings that emerge, providing opportunities for collaborative program conceptualisation and implementation.
2. Researchers should develop metrics to measure the effectiveness of CVE and CT efforts.
3. Linking GoK learning, research and training institutions to collaborate in CVE.
4. Enabling discovery of trends, linkages and patterns of violent extremist support, and providing decision makers with policy-relevant products.
5. Enhanced support by government, private sector and development partners for multidisciplinary research.
6. Establishment of well-resourced and dedicated counter-terrorism and CVE centres of excellence and research units in local universities.
7. Leveraging and encouraging the study of violent extremism by serving and retired security personnel whose experience in security offers them a strong platform to inform policy.
SECTION 4: STAKEHOLDER ENTRY POINTS
OVERVIEW

This section provides a framework to guide how various stakeholders – government ministries, departments and agencies, national and local leaders, bilateral and multilateral partners, media, religious and community leaders, civil society, the private sector, and the research community – can productively engage with the NSCVE.

The NCTC will be the lead agency coordinating all actors (state, non-state and bilateral and multilateral partners) involved in the implementation process. The NCTC will develop and review guidelines to direct implementers, and gradually – with due sensitivity to security – develop a National CVE Directory that will map actors, strategies, capabilities, and locations.

Lessons learned globally and nationally demonstrate that the following principles and approaches are important guides to partnering between states, between states and NGOs and civil society, and between organised (Government and NGO) entities and civilians and communities.

1. A ‘do no harm’ approach. CVE is a sensitive activity that is being conducted in the context of determined terrorist operations to radicalise, recruit and attack Kenyans. As such, all CVE initiatives should ensure that they do not exacerbate radicalisation or aid terrorism in any way. This should be explicitly built into all program concepts, monitoring, evaluation and reporting of local and national programmes.

2. CVE is being conducted as terrorist organisations plot to carry out attacks in Kenya. CVE efforts should be aware of the risk to their personnel, civilians and the state at all times. There should be an explicit risk analysis in every programme concept and proposal that is regularly updated by an independent security expert when a state security agency is not engaged.

(A) NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The NSCVE responds to H.E. President Uhuru Kenyatta’s call for the government to strengthen counter terrorism efforts by preventing and mitigating radicalisation through public engagement and ‘soft’ power. The following institutions will advise on the strategy’s resourcing and implementation:

• The Executive Office of the President: the NCTC Director will keep the Chief of Staff and Head of the Public Service updated on progress. H.E. the President will receive regular briefs.

• The National Security Advisory Committee will receive regular updates on the progress of the NSCVE.
(B) COMMUNITIES, CITIZENS AND ELECTED LEADERS

Every CVE effort will be responsive to the need to involve communities and citizens. They are the ‘ground zero’ that violent extremists and terrorists seek to intimidate and control, and every effort by the government and the NGO sector is aimed at serving them. It is citizen ownership of CVE that will provide Kenya’s democracy long-term resilience against the appeal of violent extremism. Credible community forums that reflect the diversity and different points of view on the ground should be important engagement points for all CVE actors.

Kenya is a democracy. Elected officials at the Ward, Constituency, County and National levels speak for the largest political constituencies in the country. It is therefore imperative that elected officials be engaged in CVE through their leadership and be empowered and consulted by the spectrum of local and national CVE actors.

(C) KENYA GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

The foremost aim of CVE by government is to protect Kenyans from violent extremists, to increase positive citizen-government linkages, and to ensure law and order. The role of government in CVE is therefore central, and particularly so given the security vulnerabilities from violent extremists.

The Kenyan government is engaged in multiple CVE initiatives, most of which remain outside a coordinated framework, and as such are susceptible to duplication. Broad approaches and principles for engagement have been identified and are enumerated below:

1. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) will coordinate national efforts in CVE.

2. The Regional Coordinators, County Commissioners, and particularly the County Security and Intelligence Committees will play a critical role in coordinating implementation on the ground.

3. There shall be development of practical, action-oriented, and priority-driven county-level deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation bodies that incorporate members of the County Security and Intelligence Committee and representatives of the County Government, the County Assembly, local religious and civic leaders, youth representatives, researchers and local private sector members.

4. At the national level, the NCTC should seek to identify and promote synergies in the counter/de-radicalisation dimensions of the work of ministries, departments and agencies.
5. Joint efforts and coordinated budgeting where possible will be strongly encouraged between government entities to ensure maximum synergy and minimum duplication.

6. All efforts by government bodies should provide for participation by citizens, NGOs/CBOs, the private sector, researchers and religious and civil leaders at the local and national level.

7. No effort should be spared to ensure that CVE is protective of the human rights and civil liberties of Kenyans.

(D) THE PRIVATE SECTOR

The private sector is a frequent victim of attacks by violent extremists. Its interests in securing its employees, clients and properties make it a crucial actor in CVE.

In addition, the private sector offers myriad opportunities to strengthen and even transform CVE, such as marketing expertise, training, media, and entrepreneurship experience, and Corporate Social Responsibility programmes in education and community development.

Some players on the frontline and who should be central partners with other CVE stakeholders are:

• The private security industry.

• The private education industry – from primary school to colleges and universities.

• The media, which should be engaged to broadcast messages that counter radicalisation and build national unity and cohesion.

• The public relations and marketing industry, which should be encouraged to deploy its expertise to craft messages that can effectively delegitimise violent extremists.

• The vibrant IT industry, which should bring to bear technological expertise and insight in the fight against violent extremism on the Internet.

• Corporate Social Responsibility programmes.

• Private sector groupings, which should be engaged at the structural level to bring the collective weight of industry to bear on specific opportunities.
(E) CIVIL SOCIETY, NGOS AND CBOS

Radicalisation is often fed by real and perceived local disaffection and alienation from the state, and mainstream political life. This distance can be closed by effective NGOs and CBOs that have local credibility in seeking to build community resilience against radicalisation. This strategy puts civil society groups at the heart of the CVE response.

Recognising the security sensitivity and risks, and in search of positive synergies, all NGOs and CBOs that are implementing CVE in partnership with the GoK should:

• Seek the input of the NCTC and its written acknowledgment that the programme will be an effective addition to on-going CVE efforts, is accountable, transparent, has conducted a risk analysis, and utilises public resources responsibly.

• For programmes being implemented locally, provide information necessary to enable the NCTC to inform the Chair of the County Security and Intelligence Committee with a view to ensuring synergies are exploited and gaps addressed.

• File a biannual report with the NCTC reflecting activities undertaken, numbers of individuals engaged, challenges encountered, outputs, and perceived outcomes.

• Be committed to the protection and advancement of the letter and spirit of the Kenyan constitution, and particularly its values.

• Be committed to the freedom of association and religious belief and practice, the equality both genders and of all ethnic and racial groupings, and the freedom of all Kenyans regardless of their religion, ethnicity or origin, to live in any part of Kenya.

• Be accountable and legitimate to a well-defined constituency.

• Be aware of the risk to their personnel, civilians and the state at all times. There should be an explicit risk analysis in every program concept and proposal that is regularly updated by an independent security expert when a state security agency is not engaged.

All groups engaged in CVE, particularly in those areas that may lead to direct contact and programming with violent extremists, should be extremely cognisant of the laws pertaining to the financing and facilitation of terrorist groups. It is strongly advised that they seek to inform and collaborate with security actors such as the NCTC and the CSIC.
Entry Points:

NGOs and CBOs can get involved by:

1. Challenging extremist speech and violent extremist ideologies online and within communities.
2. Participating in collaborative efforts with local government and business to deliver security and development at the national and local level.
3. Providing livelihood support to unemployed and under-employed youth through education, training, and internships/apprenticeships.
4. Liaising with community policing mechanisms to enhance human security at the local level.
5. Conducting participatory research on social, economic and cultural factors that lead to community resilience and development.
6. Conducting empirical research on GoK, NGO and CBO CVE impact.
7. Advocacy for effective government at the local level in regard to the delivery of basic services, including through the mapping and reporting of corrupt practices.

(F) BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PARTNERS

In regard to multilateral partners, Kenya’s CVE initiatives will be responsive to the principles, practices and strategies of the UN Counter Terrorism Architecture, including binding Security Council resolutions and the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. In programme conception, ownership and implementation, Kenya embraces long-standing commitments to ‘best practice’ approaches in regard to national ownership, and particularly the delivering as one approach.

There are particular implementation challenges and opportunities that are especially important to the bilateral and multilateral partners and allies with which Kenya works extensively. It is critical that partners follow the approaches outlined below and the principles committed to in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action in the context of CVE.

1. **Ownership**: Countries lead the conception and prioritisation of their development processes through wider participation in formulation, taking a greater lead in aid coordination, and utilising every available opportunity to deliver through government systems. CVE funding/support should have the recognition of the National Government.

2. **Harmonisation**: It is critical that donors ensure that duplication is avoided through better coordination, information sharing, simplified application and implementation, and shared
reporting processes. It is recommended that all programmes at conception and funding explicitly demonstrate that they are filling a necessary gap and are not duplicating efforts.

3. **Implementation**: For the sake of effectiveness, seek support by NGOs and CBOs that have collaborated with the GoK on their programme design and implementation approach. The NCTC will provide a list of diverse NGOs and CBOs who will be able to dovetail their work to the on-going efforts by the GoK.

4. **Results**: A focus on embracing and communicating measurable results for CVE.

5. **Accountability**: All actors are mutually accountable for CVE results, particularly in their impact on national security. The NCTC will carry out an annual assessment of the impact of donor programmes and funding on violent extremism at the local and national level.

6. **Sustained effort**: The Kenyan Government should seek to invest financial and human resources in CVE, and specifically invest in promising and impactful projects so that it remains their long-term funder.

7. **Security agencies cooperation in CVE**: Kenya’s partners in countering terrorism all deploy prevention and disengagement programmes that work with state and non-state actors. Robust working links with security agencies are encouraged, particularly due to the need for targeted, intelligence informed efforts that are sensitive to the security risks that come with prevent and CVE.
SECTION 5: MEASURING CVE IMPACT
All actors are mutually accountable for CVE results, for a variety of reasons.

- CVE, taking place as it does in the context of counter terrorist and terrorist operations, carries risks of bringing actors into negative contact with terrorists. There is a risk, for instance, of CVE funding being utilised by a terrorist who is intent on carrying out an attack.

- As limited resources are competed for by various important priorities, it is important for CVE initiatives to demonstrate that they are an effective investment. This requires not only financial accountability but also a demonstration of positive effect.

- At the conceptual level, we start by observing that every country, globally, is in many ways on a learning curve in CVE. As a result, there are many untested theories of change that are being implemented. It is important that lessons be taken from the Kenyan experience, and Kenyan CVE be shaped by the particularity of Kenyan dynamics.

The principles that will inform measurement are:

- Best practice must not become dogma – unchecked, today’s best practice can become tomorrow’s dangerous institutional bias or culture.

- The public resources utilised in CVE should be accounted for to the Kenyan people.

- CVE initiatives should be subject to regular independent reviews.

- CVE should adopt a rigorous 'do no harm' approach at an initiative’s outset and throughout its life cycle.

- CVE actors should operate within the spirit and letter of the Kenyan constitution, the rule of law, and binding regulations.

- CVE initiatives should be informed by verifiable expertise, knowledge and experience.

- CVE should be Kenyan-led.

- Measurement should go beyond perception to engage with factual data and verifiable observation.

The components of measurement to be implemented may include, but are not limited to the following:

1. **Partner Assessment Framework**: The NCTC will and coordinate the eventual development and deployment of an assessment framework for the impact of bilateral and multilateral CVE funding and efforts on national security and human security in Kenya. This will bring to bear multiple actors at the national and county level, NGOs, community political and religious leaders and researchers. This assessment will be availed to the national leadership.
2. **Cohesion Index**: Expansion of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) Cohesion Index to more frequently measure cohesion on ethnic, religious, regional and gender bases and that is connected to GoK and NSA planning and action.

3. **Radicalisation Index**: The NCTC should coordinate the development of a Radicalisation Index that utilises regular public and expert surveys with a focus on disaggregating the trends in radicalisation against the on-going CVE work in particular locations and milieu.

4. **Embracing Alternative Approaches**: Often, important changes in the ways that violent extremism is being propagated or can be effectively combated are unrecognised by the bulk of the CVE and CT community. The NSCVE therefore should incorporate periodic reviews of its assumptions and approaches.

5. **Evaluation Expertise**: Support the emergence of CVE evaluation expertise that is accessible and independent in the NGO sector. This should be budgeted for in every CVE proposal and regularly review implementation.

**Annex** — An implementation and resource matrix with elaborate activities and implementing actors plus expected outputs and outcomes will be held at the NCTC. This will serve to align the human and capital resources with state and non-state CVE stakeholders. The implementation matrix will include a monitoring and evaluation framework to capture the most important CVE programmes.